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Overview 
To further ensure a successful integration of renewable energies, technical, financial and 
organizational aspects of the electricity system have to be redesigned. A main challenge lies 
in the alignment of generation and demand of energy due to the fluctuating character of 
renewables. Several possibilities are being discussed to align this imbalance. One possibility 
is the market integration of renewables by linking the generation of renewable electricity to 
the price signals of the energy exchange markets. In the year 2012 the German government 
introduced the market premium for supporting the direct marketing of electricity from 
renewable energies. The AMIRIS agent-based simulation model allows testing and analysing 
the impacts of the market premium on the involved market actors (e.g. renewable power 
plant operators and direct marketers) on the micro level as well as effects on the macro level 
(energy exchange prices and market structure) of the energy market system. 
 
Motivation 
In order to create well defined and reliable political guidelines and regulatory frameworks, it 
is essential to analyse the market players. Their motivation, strategies and course of action 
relating to discussed adaptions as well as the impact of their action on the whole market 
system has to be understood. 
For the analysis of complex and multiple linked systems with autonomous actors agent-
based models - originating from the research field of artificial intelligence - are particularly 
suitable [1]. The development of the agent-based simulation model AMIRIS2 allows to 
examine the impact of support instruments and changes in the regulatory framework for the 
integration of renewable energies on the market actors and the market system of renewable 
energies. The AMIRIS model considers decisions of actors as well as the adaption of their 
behaviour [2]. Therefore, a reasonable simulation requires an elaborate analysis of relevant 
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actors. This analysis has been carried out with qualitative methods from social science, led 
by theoretical assumptions of the sociological Neo-Institutionalism [3]. 
With the help of document analysis and semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
the relevant actor groups first propositions were formulated. The focus has been set on how 
various regulation mechanisms would influence actors’ goals, strategies and options. The 
collected propositions and statements were finally discussed and modified in an expert 
workshop. Further, these results were translated into a formalised model language and 
implemented into the AMIRIS model, using the simulation platform Repast Simphony 2.0.  
 
Agent-based Modelling and Simulation 
For the investigation of complex network systems the approach of multi-agent modelling 
and simulation is frequently used. In such economic systems the system as a whole follows 
an evolutionary path. In this it differs significantly from the usual assumption of the 
omniscient, utility-maximizing individuals of neoclassical economics that result in a series of 
general equilibriums [4]. The system behaviour in agent modelling results from the 
behaviour of individual agents - called actors in the real world - and is not centrally 
determined and controlled. 
The agents are situated in and influenced by a dynamic environment, which is 
simultaneously shape through the actions of the agents - thus creating a complex structure 
with feedback loops. These heterogeneous agents are modelled having individual states, 
actions and goals. By implementing tactics and strategies it is also possible to model long-
term action strategies. Agents can further be set up having the ability to communicate and 
cooperate with each other [5], [6]. In addition, the agents can be implemented with learning 
algorithms [7]. This enables them to improve over the course of simulation by gaining 
knowledge and, therefore, changing their basis of decision-making. 
Agent based approaches to analyse market mechanisms are getting more and more popular 
in economics. But existing agent based models of the energy sector either focus on the 
market mechanisms of conventional power systems and electricity markets [8], [9] on 
certain aspects of the market design of the wholesale market [10], [11], [12], on the 
evaluation of specific bidding strategies and decision rules [13], [14], [15], or - when dealing 
with RES - only on market processes, i.e. the influence of the increasing share of renewables 
on the market price [16]. No one so far has tried to set up an agent based simulation model 
in order to analyse the policy framework of energy markets and its effect on the actors 
involved in the process of market integration of RES. 
 
Actor Analysis 
In order to set-up the agent based simulation model an actor analysis of the relevant actors 
was conducted. At its starting point the analysis took assumptions derived from the 
sociological theory of strategic action fields, as well as concepts from neo-institutionalism of 
organisational sociology. The theory of strategic action fields [3] offers a specific viewpoint 
by interpreting activities related to direct marketing as the attempt of competing actors to 
shape and design a specific field of action as a new market. Such a new, emergent field 
typically consists of three types of actors: incumbent actors, challengers, and governance 
units. In order to understand the competing interests and identities of the respective actors, 
it could be referred to neo-institutionalist organisational theories. Seen from this 
perspective, formal institutions, actors, and routines are mutually constitutive and influence 
each other. In order to understand the behaviour of economic actors, sociological concepts 
have developed alternative approaches to the typical neo-classical understanding of actors 
as ‘homo economicus’. Typically economic actors’ behaviour is efficiency-oriented, but is 
nevertheless also led by external expectations and sometimes non-economic requests, and 
is thus shaped by dominant institutions in the specific organisational field [17]. For this 
reason, different actors from differing backgrounds and environments develop different 
strategies with regard to goals, as well as with regard to those strategies and measures 
required to reach their specific goals. For example the actions of new firms with close links 
to the environmental scene differ from large utility companies traditionally used to 
centralised structures. 
Those general theory-led assumptions and propositions were substantiated according to the 
objectives, strategies and interaction patterns of the different actors in the new action field 
of direct marketing. Then they were developed further on the back of document analysis 
and expert interviews. The assumptions were then tested and reassessed in interviews with 
representatives from the most important actor-groups, as well as in the context of an actor 
workshop. 
The actor analysis was complemented by further research data relating to trends, forecasts, 
and price developments. Furthermore assumptions on technological developments 
according to efficiency or the relevance of new energy technologies were taken into 
consideration. Finally propositions were formulated on how different actors would react to 
the new regulatory framework, which actors would profit from the new regulatory 
incentives, and which would be negatively affected. 
In a last step all these results were translated into a formalised model language in order to 
be integrated into the simulation model AMIRIS. 
 
The AMIRIS Model 
The actual structure of the model is shown in Figure 1: Plant operators are characterized by 
technology - wind, photovoltaic (PV), bio mass -, and the renewable energy FIT remuneration 
class (RC) as shown in table 1 as well the kind of property ownership (private person, farmer, 
funds, municipal utilities, utilities, industry/ business). 
 
Figure 1  Structure of the AMIRIS model 
 
 Wind (WAB) PV (PvAB) Biomass (BmAB) 
RC 1 basic FIT  Roof-top < 30 kW, 
since 2012 < 10 kW 
Solid biomass 5-20 MW 
(matured wood, forest 
residues) 
RC 2 Starting FIT  
(low average) 
Roof-top 30-1000 kW, 
since 2012 10-1000 kW 
wood gasification 
RC 3 Starting FIT  
(high average) 
Roof-top > 1000 kW Biogas 50-350 kW (liquid 
manure und re-growing 
resources) 
RC 4 Offshore Conversion and Open 
space  
Biogas > 350 kW (liquid 
manure, re-growing 
resources,  organic waste) 
Table 1: Types of power plant operators in the AMIRIS Modell 
They can act in a passive and an active way. Plant operators following the passive way do not 
participate in direct marketing but sell the generated electricity to the distribution system 
operator and receive the defined feed in tariff (FIT). The ones acting actively sign a contract with 
an intermediary (direct marketer) in order to take advantages of the introduced optional market 
premium. The intermediaries will pay a bonus “X” on top of the FIT; otherwise there would be no 
incentive to opt for direct marketing. To compensate for the expanses the intermediaries have 
trough their direct marketing activity, they receive a ‘Management Premium’, which is part of the 
optional Market Premium support scheme introduced by the German government in January 
2012. Regarding to the height of the management premium - which is decrease by law over the 
years - and their financial success in each accounting year, the intermediaries adjust the bonus 
paid to the power plant operators. 
The analysis of actors revealed, that nine specific intermediaries are to be considered, that use 
the market premium model as shown in table 2: 
 Prototype Capital 
resources 
(million €) 
Market 
premium 
Tariff Output 
Forecast 
quality 
Price 
Forecast 
quality 
(1) Big national utility 100 2012 FIT+X Good Good 
(2) International utility 15 2012 FIT+X Good Good 
(3) Big municipal utility 15 2012 FIT+X Medium Good 
(4) Municipal utility 
“Pionier” 
15 2012 FIT+X Good Good 
(5) Small municipal utility 7 2012 FIT+X Bad Bad 
(6) Green electricity trader 
for households 
7 2012 FIT+X Good Medium 
(7) Green electricity trader 
for business/industry 
7 2012 FIT+X Good Medium 
(8) Specialized intermediary 
with experience  
3 2012 FIT+X Good Good 
(9) Specialized intermediary 
without experience 
0,1 2012 FIT+X Medium Medium 
Table 2: Types of intermediaries (direct marketers) in the AMIRIS Modell 
In addition, the intermediaries are allowed to offer capacity from biogas plants as minute reserve 
at the control reserve market. This way extra revenues can be obtained. 
The initial compositions of the portfolios of the intermediaries are show in figure 2. Over the time 
of simulation the structure of the composition of each intermediary does not change, but the 
overall amount of capacity being in direct marketing increases. 
 
Figure 2: Initial composition of the portfolios of the intermediaries in AMIRIS. 
The energy exchange prices are calculated on an hourly basis by a stylised merit-order model of 
the conventional generation system (nuclear, lignite, hard coal, GTCC and gas turbine). The 
minute reserve market prices are modelled by a regression model with residual load, wind and PV 
feed-in as independent variables. 
 
Results 
The AMIRIS model is a flexible tool for political consulting as simulations can be configured 
and parameterized in manifold ways. Among others, it is studied how factors like the quality 
of forecast, the portfolio composition, cost for profile services etc. affect the market position 
of intermediaries. Regarding plant operators, it is analyzed which remuneration class profit 
the most from direct marketing and if there are sufficient incentives to realize a more 
demand orientated feed-in of renewables. The simulations are run on an hourly basis. 
Figure 3 shows overall operation profits3 per accounting year for intermediaries taking part 
in direct marketing over the electricity exchange. The development of the overall profit is 
illustrated for the years 2012 to 2019 assuming a declining management premium (according 
to [18]). Especially these intermediaries profit from the floating market premium, that have 
experiences in direct marketing and related activities – mainly energy trading – and which 
signed contracts with onshore wind plant operators early (INT2/International Utility, 
INT4/First-Mover municipal utility an INT6/specialized direct marketer with experience). An 
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important factor for economic success is the quality of output forecast that directly 
influences the costs for balancing energy. The declining management premium (the decline 
was decided in 2012) affects smaller intermediaries with a lower quality forecast and smaller 
portfolio (INT3/big municipal utilities, INT5/small municipal utilities, INT10/new company 
without experience). Therefore a market concentration seems likely in the years after full 
degression (2015 onwards). 
 
 
Figure 3  Development of overall results for the years 2012 to 2019 for the intermediaries participating at the 
market premium. 
Concerning power plant operators, the wind power plant operators profit clearly from direct 
marketing and the market premium, as bonus payments of the intermediaries are high due 
to the relative high management premium for intermitted RES and compared to the 
corresponding feed-in-tariffs. On-shore power plants gain on average additional revenues of 
about 2,99 % - 3,35 % for the period between 2012 and 2019. Bio mass power plants, which 
are actually well suited for demand oriented supply due to their non-volatile feed-in, profit 
less compared to all other renewables and gain only 1,12 % regarding plants for solid fuels 
(BmAB1), 0,64 % regarding big biogas plants (BmB4), see figure 4. 
It remains unclear, if a more flexible operation with a simplified day-night cycle4 of the 
plants with solid biofuels (BmAB1) could generate enough profit in order to refinance 
investments in heat storage and additional generation capacity as these power plants are by 
law not allowed to receive the flexibility premium5 compared to the biogas power plants 
(BmAB3 und BmAB4). 
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Figure 4  Additional revenues of biomass plants operators from participating at direct marketing compared to 
the EEG-fedd-in-tariff6. 
By taking part in the balancing power market, the direct marketing becomes lucrative for 
solid fuel plants (BmAB1) as well as for big biogas plants (BmAB4)7. The additional revenues 
compared to the EEG-feed-in-tariff are shown in figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5  Additional receipts compared to the EEG-fedd-in-tariff for biomass plants operators from participating 
at direct marketing and balancing power market (negative minute reserve). 
The importance of participating at the balancing power market is even raised by the 
expected degression of the relative market value of biomass plants, as can be seen in 
figure 6. Assuming an increase of the installed power of PV power plants, peak prices at 
noon will strongly decrease until 2020, so that the relative market value of biomass plants 
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costly to handle for the intermediaries. 
operating only a simplified day-night cycle falls below 100 %. This effect indicates the 
importance of considering interdependencies between the feed in of different renewables 
when analyzing market potentials.  
 
 
Figure 6  Development of relative market values of RES compared to Phealix base for the years 2012-2019. 
 
An unscheduled degression of the management premium was introduced in mid-2012 after 
politics have figured that the original management premium has led to excessive over 
supports. The simulation results also show, that the degression of the management 
premium leads to the expected savings of support costs of about 110 to 210 Mio. €. 
Furthermore, calculations of the whole support budget indicate, that additional costs due to 
the support of renewables via EEG-feed-in-tariff and market premium decrease from 112 
€/MWh to 105 €/MWh in 2020 based on the degression of remuneration rates8. In 
consequence of the market premium, the overall support budget increases from about 300 
Mio. € in the year 2012 to about 400 Mio. € in the year 20199.  
 
Regarding current debates in science and politics about direct marketing of renewables, the 
effect of an obligatory direct marketing is studied under the premise, that the obligation 
implicit an avoidance of the management premium. So only the market premium is paid to 
the direct marketers. This leads to a decrease of intermediaries’ profits whereas costs for 
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9 These numbers do not consider the savings due to the fact, that the marketing costs of the system operators 
are omitted by the direct marketing. 
staff, marketing etc. remain. Simulation results for the intermediaries for the above 
mentioned premise are shown in figure 710. 
 
 
Figure 7  Specific costs for direct marketing for different types of intermediaries in case of obligatory direct 
marketing. 
The specific costs for direct marketing are between 1€/MWh and 3,5€/MWh in the years 
2012 to 2019 depending on the type of intermediary. These values match quite good the 
estimation of direct marketers as validations by experts have shown. The costs depend 
mainly on the portfolio of intermediaries – high shares of volatile renewables result in higher 
costs due to necessary output forecasts and tend to higher cost for matching the announced 
schedule with the actual feed-in compared to high shares of controllable renewables. As 
marketing costs are not compensated by the management premium, intermediaries will 
possibly charge the power plant operators in order to omit financial losses. Thus, the 
illustrated specific costs for direct marketing as shown in figure 7 plus n profit margin for the 
intermediaries of about 1-2 €/MWh can be interpreted as a reduction of remuneration of 
the plant operators. 
The simulation results show possible risks:  
 
• Market concentration: Intermediaries with big diversified portfolios may have lower 
marketing costs than other intermediaries, as scaling effects for electricity trading as 
well as spatial distribution of renewable power plants affect the costs positively. This 
may lead to market concentration und support powerful intermediaries that may use 
their market power to negatively influence further investments into renewables. 
• Rising costs: Todays diversity of intermediaries could be achieved because also small 
direct marketers with small portfolios can act successfully at the market. In case this 
diversity is to be preserved, policy instruments must allow the compensation of 
specific costs for direct marketing by a premium. This premium could imply rising 
support costs for electricity from renewables. 
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• Reduced remuneration: The obligatory direct marketing without management 
premium is an indirect reduction of remuneration for power plant operators. The 
amount of reduction equals the specific cost for marketing plus a profit margin for 
the intermediaries. This weakens the incentives to invest in renewable energies, 
especially in volatile renewables. 
 
Compared to the impact on volatile renewables, the obligatory direct marketing implies less 
risk for controllable renewable power plant operators. The participation of controllable 
renewables at the market would enhance their flexibility potential, as long as financing of 
necessary technologies is given. 
 
Conclusion 
The focus of the investigation is on the one hand on the opportunities of gaining additional 
revenues through the direct marketing supported by new regulation mechanisms like the 
‘optional market premium’ (§ 33g  EEG). On the other hand, additional risks related to direct 
marketing, to which different actors with different capital backgrounds and energy portfolios 
are exposed to, are analysed under the paradigm of imperfect knowledge. First simulation 
runs show that the introduction of the ‘market premium’ leads to diverse economic effects 
on the power plant operators as well as on the intermediaries. Even if the ‘macro-economic’ 
impact like the overall costs of the support mechanisms of different schemes might not be 
so diverse, the ‘micro-economic’ impact on the different actors itself can be huge. 
Viewing market integration processes of renewables from an agent based perspective allows 
for innovative computational analyses of the interdependencies between the relevant 
actors. It goes beyond standard market structure analysis by attempting to combine actor 
based and systemic considerations. With the agent-based simulation model AMIRIS 
influences of different policy-designs on a macro as well as micro scale can be analysed. 
These kinds of analyses are necessary to be able to construct sound support schemes in 
order to promote market development on the one hand but prevent windfall profits by 
certain actors on the other hand. 
Future work will concentrate on a more dynamic sampling of the agents and of the model 
itself. Up to now many parameters of the model and especially of the agents can change 
over time but are set external. Other aspects to be included deal with the analysis of 
different market designs for the time when high shares of renewables are already integrated 
into to the energy system. 
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